Various optimality properties of universal sequence predictors based on Bayesmixtures in general, and Solomonoff's prediction scheme in particular, will be studied. The probability of observing x t at time t, given past observations x 1 ...x t−1 can be computed with the chain rule if the true generating distribution µ of the sequences x 1 x 2 x 3 ... is known. If µ is unknown, but known to belong to a countable or continuous class M one can base ones prediction on the Bayes-mixture ξ defined as a w ν -weighted sum or integral of distributions ν ∈ M. The cumulative expected loss of the Bayes-optimal universal prediction scheme based on ξ is shown to be close to the loss of the Bayes-optimal, but infeasible prediction scheme based on µ. We show that the bounds are tight and that no other predictor can lead to significantly smaller bounds. Furthermore, for various performance measures, we show Pareto-optimality of ξ and give an Occam's razor argument that the choice w ν ∼ 2 −K(ν) for the weights is optimal, where K(ν) is the length of the shortest program describing ν. The results are applied to games of chance, defined as a sequence of bets, observations, and rewards. The prediction schemes (and bounds) are compared to the popular predictors based on expert advice. Extensions to infinite alphabets, partial, delayed and probabilistic prediction, classification, and more active systems are briefly discussed.
Introduction
Many problems are of the induction type in which statements about the future have to be made, based on past observations. What is the probability of rain tomorrow, given the weather observations of the last few days? Is the Dow Jones likely to rise tomorrow, given the chart of the last years and possibly additional newspaper information? Can we reasonably doubt that the sun will rise tomorrow? Indeed, one definition of science is to predict the future, where, as an intermediate step, one tries to understand the past by developing theories and finally to use the prediction as the basis for some decision. Most induction problems can be studied in the Bayesian framework. The probability of observing x t at time t, given the observations x 1 ...x t−1 can be computed with the chain rule, if we know the true probability distribution, which generates the observed sequence x 1 x 2 x 3 .... The problem is that in many cases we do not even have a reasonable guess of the true distribution µ. What is the true probability of weather sequences, stock charts, or sunrises?
In order to overcome the problem of the unknown true distribution, one can define a mixture distribution ξ as a weighted sum or integral over distributions ν ∈ M, where M is any discrete or continuous (hypothesis) set including µ. M is assumed to be known and to contain the true distribution, i.e. µ ∈ M. Since the probability ξ can be shown to converge rapidly to the true probability µ in a conditional sense, making decisions based on ξ is often nearly as good as the infeasible optimal decision based on the unknown µ [MF98] . Solomonoff [Sol64] had the idea to define a universal mixture as a weighted average over deterministic programs. Lower weights were assigned to longer programs. He unified Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations and Occam's razor [simplicity] principle into one formal theory (See [LV97] for this interpretation of [Sol64] ). Inspired by Solomonoff's idea, Levin [ZL70] defined the closely related universal prior ξ U as a weighted average over all semi-computable probability distributions. If the environment possesses some effective structure at all, Solomonoff-Levin's posterior "finds" this structure [Sol78] , and allows for a good prediction. In a sense, this solves the induction problem in a universal way, i.e. without making problem specific assumptions.
Section 2 explains notation and defines the universal or mixture distribution ξ as the w ν -weighted sum of probability distributions ν of a set M, which includes the true distribution µ. No structural assumptions are made on the ν. ξ multiplicatively dominates all ν ∈ M, and the relative entropy between µ and ξ is bounded by lnw −1 µ . Convergence of ξ to µ in a mean squared sense is shown in Theorem 1. The representation of the universal posterior distribution and the case µ ∈M are briefly discussed. Various standard sets M of probability measures are discussed, including computable, enumerable, cumulatively enumerable, approximable, finite-state, and Markov (semi)measures.
Section 3 is essentially a generalization of the deterministic error bounds found in [Hut01b] from the binary alphabet to a general finite alphabet X . Theorem 2 bounds E Θ ξ −E Θµ by O( √ E Θµ ), where E Θ ξ is the expected number of errors made by the optimal universal predictor Θ ξ , and E Θµ is the expected number of errors made by the optimal informed prediction scheme Θ µ . The non-binary setting cannot be reduced to the binary case! One might think of a binary coding of the symbols x t ∈ X in the sequence x 1 x 2 .... But this makes it necessary to predict a block of bits x t , before one receives the true block of bits x t , which differs from the bit by bit prediction scheme considered in [Sol78, Hut01b] . The framework generalizes to the case where an action y t ∈ Y results in a loss ℓ xtyt if x t is the next symbol of the sequence. Optimal universal Λ ξ and optimal informed Λ µ prediction schemes are defined for this case, and loss bounds similar to the error bounds of the last section are stated. No assumptions on ℓ have to be made, besides boundedness.
Section 4 applies the loss bounds to games of chance, defined as a sequence of bets, observations, and rewards. The average profitp Λ ξ n achieved by the Λ ξ scheme rapidly converges to the best possible average profitp Λµ n achieved by the Λ µ scheme (p
If there is a profitable scheme at all (p Λµ n > ε > 0), asymptotically the universal Λ ξ scheme will also become profitable. Theorem 3 bounds the time needed to reach the winning zone. It is proportional to the relative entropy of µ and ξ with a factor depending on the profit range and onp
Λµ
n . An attempt is made to give an information theoretic interpretation of the result.
Section 5 discusses the quality of the universal predictor and the bounds. We show that there are M and µ ∈ M and weights w ν such that the derived error bounds are tight. This shows that the error bounds cannot be improved in general. We also show Pareto-optimality of ξ in the sense that there is no other predictor which performs at least as well in all environments ν ∈ M and strictly better in at least one. Optimal predictors can always be based on mixture distributions ξ. This still leaves open how to choose the weights. We give an Occam's razor argument that the choice w ν = 2 −K(ν) , where K(ν) is the length of the shortest program describing ν is optimal.
Section 6 generalizes the setup to continuous probability classes M = {µ θ } consisting of continuously parameterized distributions µ θ with parameter θ ∈ IR d . Under certain smoothness and regularity conditions a bound for the relative entropy between µ and ξ, which is central for all presented results, can still be derived. The bound depends on the Fisher information of µ and grows only logarithmically with n, the intuitive reason being the necessity to describe θ to an accuracy O(n −1/2 ). Furthermore, two ways of using the prediction schemes for partial sequence prediction, where not every symbol needs to be predicted, are described. Performing and predicting a sequence of independent experiments and online learning of classification tasks are special cases. We also compare the universal prediction scheme studied here to the popular predictors based on expert advice (PEA) [LW89, Vov92, LW94, CB97, HKW98, KW99] . Although the algorithms, the settings, and the proofs are quite different, the PEA bounds and our error bound have the same structure. Finally, we outline possible extensions of the presented theory and results, including infinite alphabets, delayed and probabilistic prediction, active systems influencing the environment, learning aspects, and a unification with PEA.
Section 7 summarizes the results.
There are good introductions and surveys of Solomonoff sequence prediction [LV92, LV97] , inductive inference in general [AS83, Sol97, MF98] , reasoning under uncertainty [Grü98] , and competitive online statistics [Vov99] , with interesting relations to this work. See Section 6.3 for some more details.
Setup and Convergence
In this section we show that the mixture ξ converges rapidly to the true distribution µ. After defining basic notation in Section 2.1, we introduce in Section 2.2 the universal or mixture distribution ξ as the w ν -weighted sum of probability distributions ν of a set M, which includes the true distribution µ. No structural assumptions are made on the ν. ξ multiplicatively dominates all ν ∈M. A posterior representation of ξ with incremental weight update is presented in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we show that the relative entropy between µ and ξ is bounded by lnw −1 µ and that ξ converges to µ in a mean squared sense. The case µ ∈ M is briefly discussed in Section 2.5. The section concludes with Section 2.6, which discusses various standard sets M of probability measures, including computable, enumerable, cumulatively enumerable, approximable, finite-state, and Markov (semi)measures.
Random Sequences
We denote strings over a finite alphabet X by x 1 x 2 ...x n with x t ∈ X and t,n,N ∈ IN and N = |X |. We further use the abbreviations ǫ for the empty string, x t:n := x t x t+1 ...x n−1 x n for t ≤ n and ǫ for t > n, and x <t := x 1 ...x t−1 . We use Greek letters for probability distributions (or measures). Let ρ(x 1 ...x n ) be the probability that an (infinite) sequence starts with x 1 ...x n :
We also need conditional probabilities derived from the chain rule:
The first equation states that the probability that a string x 1 ...x t−1 is followed by x t is equal to the probability that a string starts with x 1 ...x t divided by the probability that a string starts with x 1 ...x t−1 . For convenience we define ρ(x t |x <t )=0 if ρ(x <t ) = 0. The second equation is the first, applied n times. Whereas ρ might be any probability distribution, µ denotes the true (unknown) generating distribution of the sequences. We denote probabilities by P, expectations by E and further abbreviate
Probabilities P and expectations E are always w.r.t. the true distribution µ. E 1:n = E <n E n by the chain rule and E[...]= E <t [...] if the argument is independent of x t:∞ , and so on. We abbreviate "with µ-probability 1" by w.µ.p.1. We say that z t converges to z * in mean sum (i.m.s.) if c :=
One can show that convergence in mean sum implies convergence with probability 1.
1 Convergence i.m.s. is very strong: it provides a "rate" of convergence in the sense that the expected number of times t in which z t deviates more than ε from z * is finite and bounded by c/ε 2 and the probability that the number of ε-deviations exceeds c ε 2 δ is smaller than δ.
Universal Prior Probability Distribution
Every inductive inference problem can be brought into the following form: Given a string x <t , take a guess at its continuation x t . We will assume that the strings which have to be continued are drawn from a probability 2 distribution µ. The maximal prior information a prediction algorithm can possess is the exact knowledge of µ, but in many cases (like for the probability of sun tomorrow) the true generating distribution is not known. Instead, the prediction is based on a guess ρ of µ. We expect that a predictor based on ρ performs well, if ρ is close to µ or converges, in a sense, to µ. Let M := {ν 1 ,ν 2 ,...} be a countable set of candidate probability distributions on strings. Results are generalized to continuous sets M in Section 6.1. We define a weighted average on M
It is easy to see that ξ is a probability distribution as the weights w ν are positive and normalized to 1 and the ν ∈ M are probabilities.
3 For a finite M a possible choice for the w is to give all ν equal weight (w ν =
|M|
). We call ξ universal relative to M, as it multiplicatively dominates all distributions in M ξ(x 1:n ) ≥ w ν ·ν(x 1:n ) for all ν ∈ M.
(2)
In the following, we assume that M is known and contains the true distribution, i.e. µ ∈ M. If M is chosen sufficiently large, then µ ∈ M is not a serious constraint.
1 Convergence in the mean, i.e. E[(z t −z * ) 2 ] t→∞ −→ 0, only implies convergence in probability, which is weaker than convergence with probability 1.
Universal Posterior Probability Distribution
All prediction schemes in this work are based on the conditional probabilities ρ(x t |x <t ). It is possible to express also the conditional probability ξ(x t |x <t ) as a weighted average over the conditional ν(x t |x <t ), but now with time dependent weights:
(3) The denominator just ensures correct normalization ν w ν (x 1:t ) = 1. By induction and the chain rule we see that w ν (x <t ) = w ν ν(x <t )/ξ(x <t ). Inserting this into ν w ν (x <t )ν(x t |x <t ) using (1) gives ξ(x t |x <t ), which proves the equivalence of (1) and (3). The expressions (3) can be used to give an intuitive, but non-rigorous, argument why ξ(x t |x <t ) converges to µ(x t |x <t ): The weight w ν of ν in ξ increases/decreases if ν assigns a high/low probability to the new symbol x t , given x <t . For a µ-random sequence x 1:t , µ(x 1:t )≫ν(x 1:t ) if ν (significantly) differs from µ. We expect the total weight for all ν consistent with µ to converge to 1, and all other weights to converge to 0 for t→∞. Therefore we expect ξ(x t |x <t ) to converge to µ(x t |x <t ) for µ-random strings x 1:∞ .
Expressions (3) seem to be more suitable than (1) for studying convergence and loss bounds of the universal predictor ξ, but it will turn out that (2) is all we need, with the sole exception in the proof of Theorem 6. Probably (3) is useful when one tries to understand the learning aspect in ξ.
Convergence of ξ to µ
We use the relative entropy and the squared Euclidian/absolute distance to measure the instantaneous and total distances between µ and ξ:
So bounds in terms of S n are tightest, while the (implied) looser bounds in terms of V n as a referee pointed out have an advantage in case of continuous alphabets (not considered here) to be reparametrization-invariant. The weakening to D n is used, since D n can easily be bounded in terms of the weight w µ .
Theorem 1 (Convergence) Let there be sequences x 1 x 2 ... over a finite alphabet X drawn with probability µ(x 1:n ) for the first n symbols. The universal conditional probability ξ(x t |x <t ) of the next symbol x t given x <t is related to the true conditional probability µ(x t |x <t ) in the following way:
where d t and D n are the relative entropies (4), and w µ is the weight (1) of µ in ξ.
A proof for binary alphabet can be found in [Sol78, LV97] and for a general finite alphabet in [Hut01a] . The finiteness of S ∞ implies ξ(x ′ t |x <t )−µ(x ′ t |x <t ) → 0 for t→ ∞ i.m.s., and hence w.µ.p.1 for any x ′ t . There are other convergence results, most notably ξ(x t |x <t )/µ(x t |x <t ) → 1 for t → ∞ w.µ.p.1 [LV97, Hut03a] . These convergence results motivate the belief that predictions based on (the known) ξ are asymptotically as good as predictions based on (the unknown) µ with rapid convergence.
The Case where µ ∈ M
In the following we discuss two cases, where µ ∈M, but most parts of this work still apply. Actually all theorems remain valid for µ being a finite linear combination µ(x 1:n ) = ν∈L v ν ν(x 1:n ) of ν's in L ⊆ M. Dominance ξ(x 1:n ) ≥ w µ ·µ(x 1:n ) is still ensured with w µ := min ν∈L wν vν ≥ min ν∈L w ν . More generally, if µ is an infinite linear combination, dominance is still ensured if w ν itself dominates v ν in the sense that w ν ≥ αv ν for some α > 0 (then w µ ≥ α).
Another possibly interesting situation is when the true generating distribution µ ∈M, but a "nearby" distributionμ with weight wμ is in M. If we measure the distance ofμ to µ with the Kullback-Leibler divergence D n (µ||μ):= x 1:n µ(x 1:n )ln
and assume that it is bounded by a constant c, then
µ remains valid if we define w µ := wμ·e −c .
Probability Classes M
In the following we describe some well-known and some less known probability classes M. This relates our setting to other works in this area, embeds it into the historical context, illustrates the type of classes we have in mind, and discusses computational issues. We get a rather wide class M if we include all (semi)computable probability distributions in M. In this case, the assumption µ ∈ M is very weak, as it only assumes that the strings are drawn from any (semi)computable distribution; and all valid physical theories (and, hence, all environments) are computable to arbitrary precision (in a probabilistic sense).
We will see that it is favorable to assign high weights w ν to the ν. Simplicity should be favored over complexity, according to Occam's razor. In our context this means that a high weight should be assigned to simple ν. The prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(ν) is a universal complexity measure [Kol65, ZL70, LV97] . It is defined as the length of the shortest self-delimiting program (on a universal Turing machine) computing ν(x 1:n ) given x 1:n . If we define
then distributions which can be calculated by short programs, have high weights. The relative entropy is bounded by the Kolmogorov complexity of µ in this case (D n ≤K(µ)·ln2). Levin's universal semi-measure ξ U is obtained if we take M=M U to be the (multi)set enumerated by a Turing machine which enumerates all enumerable semi-measures [ZL70, LV97] . Recently, M has been further enlarged to include all cumulatively enumerable semi-measures [Sch02a] . In the enumerable and cumulatively enumerable cases, ξ is not finitely computable, but can still be approximated to arbitrary but not pre-specifiable precision. If we consider all approximable (i.e. asymptotically computable) distributions, then the universal distribution ξ, although still well defined, is not even approximable [Hut03b] . An interesting and quickly approximable distribution is the Speed prior S defined in [Sch02b] . It is related to Levin complexity and Levin search [Lev73, Lev84] , but it is unclear for now, which distributions are dominated by S. If one considers only finite-state automata instead of general Turing machines, ξ is related to the quickly computable, universal finite-state prediction scheme of Feder et al. [FMG92] , which itself is related to the famous Lempel-Ziv data compression algorithm. If one has extra knowledge on the source generating the sequence, one might further reduce M and increase w. A detailed analysis of these and other specific classes M will be given elsewhere. Note that ξ ∈ M in the enumerable and cumulatively enumerable case, but ξ ∈ M in the computable, approximable and finite-state case. If ξ is itself in M, it is called a universal element of M [LV97]. As we do not need this property here, M may be any countable set of distributions. In the following sections we consider generic M and w.
We have discussed various discrete classes M, which are sufficient from a constructive or computational point of view. On the other hand, it is convenient to also allow for continuous classes M. For instance, the class of all Bernoulli processes with parameter θ ∈ [0,1] and uniform prior w θ ≡ 1 is much easier to deal with than computable θ only, with prior w θ = 2 −K(θ) . Other important continuous classes are the class of i.i.d. and Markov processes. Continuous classes M are considered in more detail in Section 6.1.
Error Bounds
In this section we prove error bounds for predictors based on the mixture ξ. Section 3.1 introduces the concept of Bayes-optimal predictors Θ ρ , minimizing ρ-expected error. In Section 3.2 we bound
, where E Θ ξ is the expected number of errors made by the optimal universal predictor Θ ξ , and E Θµ is the expected number of errors made by the optimal informed prediction scheme Θ µ . The proof is deferred to Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we generalize the framework to the case where an action y t ∈ Y results in a loss ℓ xtyt if x t is the next symbol of the sequence. Optimal universal Λ ξ and optimal informed Λ µ prediction schemes are defined for this case, and loss bounds similar to the error bounds are presented. No assumptions on ℓ have to be made, besides boundedness.
Bayes-Optimal Predictors
We start with a very simple measure: making a wrong prediction counts as one error, making a correct prediction counts as no error. In [Hut01b] error bounds have been proven for the binary alphabet X = {0,1}. The following generalization to an arbitrary alphabet involves only minor additional complications, but serves as an introduction to the more complicated model with arbitrary loss function. Let Θ µ be the optimal prediction scheme when the strings are drawn from the probability distribution µ, i.e. the probability of x t given x <t is µ(x t |x <t ), and µ is known. Θ µ predicts (by definition) x Θµ t when observing x <t . The prediction is erroneous if the true t th symbol is not x Θµ t . The probability of this event is 1−µ(x Θµ t |x <t ). It is minimized if x Θµ t maximizes µ(x Θµ t |x <t ). More generally, let Θ ρ be a prediction scheme predicting x Θρ t := argmax xt ρ(x t |x <t ) for some distribution ρ. Every deterministic predictor can be interpreted as maximizing some distribution.
Total Expected Numbers of Errors
The µ-probability of making a wrong prediction for the t th symbol and the total µ-expected number of errors in the first n predictions of predictor Θ ρ are
If µ is known, Θ µ is obviously the best prediction scheme in the sense of making the least number of expected errors
since
for any ρ. Of special interest is the universal predictor Θ ξ . As ξ converges to µ the prediction of Θ ξ might converge to the prediction of the optimal Θ µ . Hence, Θ ξ may not make many more errors than Θ µ and, hence, any other predictor Θ ρ . Note that x
Θρ t is a discontinuous function of ρ and x
Θµ t cannot be proven from ξ → µ. Indeed, this problem occurs in related prediction schemes, where the predictor has to be regularized so that it is continuous [FMG92] . Fortunately this is not necessary here. We prove the following error bound.
Theorem 2 (Error Bound) Let there be sequences x 1 x 2 ... over a finite alphabet X drawn with probability µ(x 1:n ) for the first n symbols. The Θ ρ -system predicts by definition x Θρ t ∈ X from x <t , where x Θρ t maximizes ρ(x t |x <t ). Θ ξ is the universal prediction scheme based on the universal prior ξ. Θ µ is the optimal informed prediction scheme. The total µ-expected number of prediction errors E Θ ξ n and E Θµ n of Θ ξ and Θ µ as defined in (7) are bounded in the following way
) is the expected number of nonoptimal predictions made by
µ , where S n is the squared Euclidian distance (5), V n half of the squared absolute distance (6), D n the relative entropy (4), and w µ the weight (1) of µ in ξ.
The first two bounds have a nice structure, but the r.h.s. actually depends on Θ ξ , so they are not particularly useful, but these are the major bounds we will prove, the others follow easily. In Section 5 we show that the third bound is optimal. The last bound, which we discuss in the following, has the same asymptotics as the third bound. Note that the bounds hold for any (semi)measure ξ; only D n ≤ln µ w −1 depends on ξ dominating µ with domination constant w µ .
First, we observe that Theorem 2 implies that the number of errors E Θ ξ ∞ of the universal Θ ξ predictor is finite if the number of errors E Θµ ∞ of the informed Θ µ predictor is finite. In particular, this is the case for deterministic µ, as E Θµ n ≡0 in this case 4 , i.e. Θ ξ makes only a finite number of errors on deterministic environments. This can also be proven by elementary means. Assume x 1 x 2 ... is the sequence generated by µ and Θ ξ makes a wrong prediction x
. Hence e
µ . A combinatoric argument given in Section 5 shows that there are M and µ∈M with E Θ ξ ∞ ≥log 2 |M|. This shows that the upper bound E Θ ξ ∞ ≤ log 2 |M| for uniform w is sharp. From Theorem 2 we get the slightly weaker bound E
µ . For more complicated probabilistic environments, where even the ideal informed system makes an infinite number of errors, the theorem ensures that the error regret E
The regret is quantified in terms of the information content D n of µ (relative to ξ), or the weight w µ of µ in ξ. This ensures that the error densities E n /n of both systems converge to each other. Actually, the theorem ensures more, namely that the quotient converges to 1, and also gives the speed of convergence E
If we increase the first occurrence of E Θµ n in the theorem to E Θ n and the second to E Θ ξ n we get the bound
n S n , which shows that no (causal) predictor Θ whatsoever makes significantly less errors than Θ ξ . In Section 5 we show that the third bound for E Θ ξ n −E Θµ n given in Theorem 2 can in general not be improved, i.e. for every predictor Θ (particularly Θ ξ ) there exist M and µ ∈ M such that the upper bound is essentially achieved. See [Hut01b] for some further discussion and bounds for binary alphabet.
Proof of Theorem 2
The first inequality in Theorem 2 has already been proven (8). For the second inequality, let us start more modestly and try to find constants A>0 and B >0 that satisfy the linear inequality
If we could show
for all t≤n and all x <t , (9) would follow immediately by summation and the definition of E n , Q n and S n . With the abbreviations
the various error functions can then be expressed by e
2 . Inserting this into (10) we get
By definition of x Θµ t and x Θ ξ t we have y m ≥ y i and z s ≥ z i for all i. We prove a sequence of inequalities which show that
is positive for suitable A≥0 and B ≥0, which proves (11). For m=s (12) is obviously positive. So we will assume m = s in the following. From the square we keep only contributions from i = m and i = s. (y m +y s ). Together with the abbreviation x := y m −y s we get
(13) is quadratic in x and minimized by
Inequality (9) therefore holds for any A > 0, provided we insert B = 1 2A
. Thus we might minimize the r.h.s. of (9) w.r.t. A leading to the upper bound
which is the first bound in Theorem 2. For the second bound we have to show
Θµ n , which follows by summation from q t ≤e
Θµ t , which is equivalent to 1−δ ms ≤ 1−y s +1−y m , which holds for m = s as well as m = s. For the third bound we have to prove
If we square both sides of this expressions and simplify we just get the second bound. Hence, the second bound implies (14). The last inequality in Theorem 2 is a simple triangle inequality. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 2 Note that also the third bound implies the second one:
where we only have used E Θ ξ n ≥ E Θµ n . Nevertheless the bounds are not equal.
General Loss Function
A prediction is very often the basis for some decision. The decision results in an action, which itself leads to some reward or loss. If the action itself can influence the environment we enter the domain of acting agents which has been analyzed in the context of universal probability in [Hut01c] . To stay in the framework of (passive) prediction we have to assume that the action itself does not influence the environment. Let ℓ xtyt ∈IR be the received loss when taking action y t ∈Y and x t ∈X is the t th symbol of the sequence. We make the assumption that ℓ is bounded. Without loss of generality we normalize ℓ by linear scaling such that 0 ≤ ℓ xtyt ≤ 1. For instance, if we make a sequence of weather forecasts X = {sunny, rainy} and base our decision, whether to take an umbrella or wear sunglasses Y = {umbrella, sunglasses} on it, the action of taking the umbrella or wearing sunglasses does not influence the future weather (ignoring the butterfly effect). The losses might be Loss sunny rainy umbrella 0.1 0.3 sunglasses 0.0 1.0
Note the loss assignment even when making the right decision to take an umbrella when it rains because sun is still preferable to rain. In many cases the prediction of x t can be identified or is already the action y t . The forecast sunny can be identified with the action wear sunglasses, and rainy with take umbrella. X ≡ Y in these cases. The error assignment of the previous subsections falls into this class together with a special loss function. It assigns unit loss to an erroneous prediction (ℓ xtyt =1 for x t =y t ) and no loss to a correct prediction (ℓ xtxt = 0).
For convenience we name an action a prediction in the following, even if X = Y. The true probability of the next symbol being x t , given x <t , is µ(x t |x <t ). The expected loss when predicting y t is E t [ℓ xtyt ]. The goal is to minimize the expected loss. More generally we define the Λ ρ prediction scheme
which minimizes the ρ-expected loss. 5 As the true distribution is µ, the actual µ-expected loss when Λ ρ predicts the t th symbol and the total µ-expected loss in the first n predictions are
Let Λ be any (causal) prediction scheme (deterministic or probabilistic does not matter) with no constraint at all, predicting any y similarly defined as (16). If µ is known, Λ µ is obviously the best prediction scheme in the sense of achieving minimal expected loss
The following loss bound for the universal Λ ξ predictor is proven in [Hut03a] .
The loss bounds have the same form as the error bounds when substituting S n ≤D n in Theorem 2. For a comparison to Merhav's and Feder's [MF98] loss bound, see [Hut03a] . Replacing D n by S n or V n in (18) gives an invalid bound, so the general bound is slightly weaker. For instance, for X ={0,1}, ℓ 00 =ℓ 11 =0, ℓ 10 =1, ℓ 01 =c<
Example loss functions including the absolute, square, logarithmic, and Hellinger loss are discussed in [Hut03a] . Instantaneous error/loss bounds can also be proven:
Application to Games of Chance
This section applies the loss bounds to games of chance, defined as a sequence of bets, observations, and rewards. After a brief introduction in Section 4.1 we show in Section 4.2 that if there is a profitable scheme at all, asymptotically the universal Λ ξ scheme will also become profitable. We bound the time needed to reach the winning zone. It is proportional to the relative entropy of µ and ξ with a factor depending on the profit range and the average profit. Section 4.3 presents a numerical example and Section 4.4 attempts to give an information theoretic interpretation of the result.
Introduction
Consider investing in the stock market. At time t an amount of money s t is invested in portfolio y t , where we have access to past knowledge x <t (e.g. charts). After our choice of investment we receive new information x t , and the new portfolio value is r t . The best we can expect is to have a probabilistic model µ of the behavior of the stock-market. The goal is to maximize the net µ-expected profit p t =r t −s t . Nobody knows µ, but the assumption of all traders is that there is a computable, profitable µ they try to find or approximate. From Theorem 1 we know that Levin's universal prior ξ U (x t |x <t ) converges to any computable µ(x t |x <t ) with probability 1. If there is a computable, asymptotically profitable trading scheme at all, the Λ ξ scheme should also be profitable in the long run. To get a practically useful, computable scheme we have to restrict M to a finite set of computable distributions, e.g. with bounded Levin complexity Kt [LV97] . Although convergence of ξ to µ is pleasing, what we are really interested in is whether Λ ξ is asymptotically profitable and how long it takes to become profitable. This will be explored in the following.
Games of Chance
We use the loss bound (18) to estimate the time needed to reach the winning threshold when using Λ ξ in a game of chance. We assume a game (or a sequence of possibly correlated games) which allows a sequence of bets and observations. In step t we bet, depending on the history
the profit range. The loss, which we want to minimize, can be defined as the negative scaled profit, ℓ xtyt = (p max −p t )/p ∆ ∈ [0,1]. The probability of outcome x t , possibly depending on the history x <t , is µ(x t |x <t ). The total µ-expected profit when using scheme Λ ρ is P
If we knew µ, the optimal strategy to maximize our expected profit is just Λ µ . We assume P Λµ n >0 (otherwise there is no winning strategy at all, since P Λµ n ≥ P Λ n ∀Λ). Often we are not in the favorable position of knowing µ, but we know (or assume) that µ ∈ M for some M, for instance that µ is a computable probability distribution. From bound (18) we see that the average profit per roundp 
P
Λµ n of the optimal informed scheme, i.e. asymptotically we can make the same money even without knowing µ, by just using the universal Λ ξ scheme. Bound (18) allows us to lower bound the universal profit P
The time needed for Λ ξ to perform well can also be estimated. An interesting quantity is the expected number of rounds needed to reach the winning zone. Using P Λµ n > 0 one can show that the r.h.s. of (19) is positive if, and only if
Theorem 3 (Time to Win) Let there be sequences x 1 x 2 ... over a finite alphabet X drawn with probability µ(x 1:n ) for the first n symbols. In step t we make a bet, depending on the history x <t , take some action y t , and observe outcome x t . Our net profit is p t ∈[p max −p ∆ ,p max ]. The Λ ρ -system (15) acts as to maximize the ρ-expected profit. P Λρ n is the total andp
n is the average expected profit of the first n rounds. For the universal Λ ξ and for the optimal informed Λ µ prediction scheme the following holds: By dividing (19) by n and using D n ≤b µ (4) we see that the leading order ofp
Example
Let us consider a game with two dice, one with two black and four white faces, the other with four black and two white faces. The dealer who repeatedly throws the dice uses one or the other die according to some deterministic rule, which correlates the throws (e.g. the first die could be used in round t iff the t th digit of π is 7). We can bet on black or white; the stake s is 3$ in every round; our return r is 5$ for every correct prediction.
The profit is p t = rδ xtyt −s. The coloring of the dice and the selection strategy of the dealer unambiguously determine µ. µ(x t |x <t ) is $ > 0. If we don't know µ we should use Levin's universal prior with D n ≤ b µ = K(µ)·ln2, where K(µ) is the length of the shortest program coding µ (see Section 2.6). Then we know that betting on the outcome with higher ξ probability leads asymptotically to the same profit (Theorem 3(i)) and Λ ξ reaches the winning threshold no later than n thresh = 900ln2·K(µ) (Theorem 3(ii)) or sharper n thresh = 330ln2·K(µ) from (20), where p max = r−s = 2$ and p ∆ = r = 5$ have been used.
If the die selection strategy reflected in µ is not too complicated, the Λ ξ prediction system reaches the winning zone after a few thousand rounds. The number of rounds is not really small because the expected profit per round is one order of magnitude smaller than the return. This leads to a constant of two orders of magnitude size in front of K(µ). Stated otherwise, it is due to the large stochastic noise, which makes it difficult to extract the signal, i.e. the structure of the rule µ (see next subsection). Furthermore, this is only a bound for the turnaround value of n thresh . The true expected turnaround n might be smaller. However, for every game for which there exists a computable winning strategy withp Λ n > ε > 0, Λ ξ is guaranteed to get into the winning zone for some n ∼ K(µ).
Information-Theoretic Interpretation
We try to give an intuitive explanation of Theorem 3(ii). We know that ξ(x t |x <t ) converges to µ(x t |x <t ) for t → ∞. In a sense Λ ξ learns µ from past data x <t . The information content in µ relative to ξ is D ∞ /ln2 ≤ b µ /ln2. One might think of a Shannon-Fano prefix code of ν ∈ M of length ⌈ b ν /ln2 ⌉ , which exists since the Kraft inequality ν 2 − ⌈ bν /ln2 ⌉ ≤ ν w ν ≤1 is satisfied. b µ /ln2 bits have to be learned before Λ ξ can be as good as Λ µ . In the worst case, the only information conveyed by x t is in form of the received profit p t . Remember that we always know the profit p t before the next cycle starts.
Assume that the distribution of the profits in the interval [p min ,p max ] is mainly due to noise, and there is only a small informative signal of amplitudep 2 )·b µ /ln2 cycles. This expression coincides with the condition in (ii). Identifying the signal amplitude withp Λµ n is the weakest part of this consideration, as we have no argument why this should be true. It may be interesting to make the analogy more rigorous, which may also lead to a simpler proof of (ii) not based on bounds (18) with their rather complex proofs.
Optimality Properties
In this section we discuss the quality of the universal predictor and the bounds. In Section 5.1 we show that there are M and µ ∈ M and weights w ν such that the derived error bounds are tight. This shows that the error bounds cannot be improved in general. In Section 5.2 we show Pareto-optimality of ξ in the sense that there is no other predictor which performs at least as well in all environments ν ∈ M and strictly better in at least one. Optimal predictors can always be based on mixture distributions ξ. This still leaves open how to choose the weights. In Section 5.3 we give an Occam's razor argument that the choice w ν = 2 −K(ν) , where K(ν) is the length of the shortest program describing ν is optimal.
Lower Error Bound
We want to show that there exists a class M of distributions such that any predictor Θ ignorant of the distribution µ ∈ M from which the observed sequence is sampled must make some minimal additional number of errors as compared to the best informed predictor Θ µ . For deterministic environments a lower bound can easily be obtained by a combinatoric argument. Consider a class M containing 2 n binary sequences such that each prefix of length n occurs exactly once. Assume any deterministic predictor Θ (not knowing the sequence in advance), then for every prediction x Θ t of Θ at times t ≤ n there exists a sequence with opposite symbol x t = 1−x Θ t . Hence, E Θ ∞ ≥ E Θ n = n = log 2 |M| is a lower worst case bound for every predictor Θ, (this includes Θ ξ , of course). This shows that the upper bound E Θ ξ ∞ ≤ log 2 |M| for uniform w obtained in the discussion after Theorem 2 is sharp. In the general probabilistic case we can show by a similar argument that the upper bound of Theorem 2 is sharp for Θ ξ and "static" predictors, and sharp within a factor of 2 for general predictors. We do not know whether the factor two gap can be closed.
Theorem 4 (Lower Error Bound) For every n there is an M and µ ∈ M and weights w ν such that
n and E Θµ n are the total expected number of errors of Θ ξ and Θ µ , and s t and S n are defined in (5). More generally, the equalities hold for any "static" deterministic predictor θ for which y Θ t is independent of x <t . For every n and arbitrary deterministic predictor Θ, there exists an M and µ ∈ M such that
Proof. (i) The proof parallels and generalizes the deterministic case. Consider a class M of 2 n distributions (over binary alphabet) indexed by a ≡ a 1 ...a n ∈ {0,1} n . For each t we want a distribution with posterior probability 1 2 (1+ε) for x t = 1 and one with posterior probability 1 2
(1−ε) for x t = 1 independent of the past x <t with 0 < ε ≤ 1 2
. That is
We are not interested in predictions beyond time n but for completeness we may define µ a to assign probability 1 to x t =1 for all t>n. If µ=µ a , the informed scheme Θ µ always predicts the bit which has highest µ-probability, i.e. y
Since E Θµ n is the same for all a we seek to maximize E Θ n for a given predictor Θ in the following. Assume Θ predicts y Θ t (independent of history x <t ). Since we want lower bounds we seek a worst case µ. A success y Θ t = x t has lowest possible probability
(1 + ε).
So we have e Θ t −e Θµ t = ε and E Θ n −E Θµ n = nε for the regrets. We need to eliminate n and ε in favor of s t , S n , and E Θµ n . If we assume uniform weights w µa = 2 −n for all µ a we get
So we have ε = √ 2s t which proves the instantaneous regret formula e √ 2n we get
Θµ n +S n . So we finally get
Θµ n S n + S 2 n which proves the total regret formula in (i) for static Θ. We can choose 6 y Θ ξ t ≡ 0 to be a static predictor. Together this shows (i).
(ii) For non-static predictors, a t =1−y Θ t in the proof of (i) depends on x <t , which is not allowed. For general, but fixed a t we have e (1−ε) and 1 2 (1+ε), when averaged over x <t , and is, hence of little direct help. But if we additionally average the result also over all environments µ a , we get A set M independent of n leading to a good (but not tight) lower bound is M={µ 1 ,µ 2 } with µ 1/2 (1|x <t )= is also finite. For instance, consider the special error-loss, binary alphabet, and |µ(x t |x <t )− . So in any case e
2 . Using (7) and Theorem 1 we see that
µ < ∞ is finite too. Nevertheless, Theorem 4 is important as it tells us that bound (18) can only be strengthened by making further assumptions on ℓ or M.
Pareto Optimality of ξ
In this subsection we want to establish a different kind of optimality property of ξ. Let F (µ,ρ) be any of the performance measures of ρ relative to µ considered in the previous sections (e.g. s t , or D n , or L n , ...). It is easy to find ρ more tailored towards µ such that F (µ,ρ) < F (µ,ξ). This improvement may be achieved by increasing w µ , but probably at the expense of increasing F for other ν, i.e. F (ν,ρ) > F (ν,ξ) for some ν ∈M. Since we do not know µ in advance we may ask whether there exists a ρ with better or equal performance for all ν ∈ M and a strictly better performance for one ν ∈ M. This would clearly render ξ suboptimal w.r.t. to F . We show that there is no such ρ for most performance measures studied in this work.
Definition 5 (Pareto Optimality) Let F (µ,ρ) be any performance measure of ρ relative to µ. The universal prior ξ is called Pareto-optimal w.r.t. F if there is no ρ with F (ν,ρ) ≤ F (ν,ξ) for all ν ∈ M and strict inequality for at least one ν.
Theorem 6 (Pareto Optimality) The universal prior ξ is Pareto-optimal w.r.t. the instantaneous and total squared distances s t and S n (5), entropy distances d t and D n (4), errors e t and E n (7), and losses l t and L n (16).
Proof. We first prove Theorem 6 for the instantaneous expected loss l t . We need the more general ρ-expected instantaneous losses
for a predictor Λ. We want to arrive at a contradiction by assuming that ξ is not Pareto-optimal, i.e. by assuming the existence of a predictor 7 Λ with l Λ tν ≤l Λ ξ tν for all ν ∈M and strict inequality for some ν. Implicit to this assumption is the assumption that l Λ tν and l
The two equalities follow from inserting (3) into (21). The strict inequality follows from the assumption and w ν (x <t ) > 0. The last inequality follows from the fact that Λ ξ minimizes by definition (15) the ξ-expected loss (similarly to (17)). The contradiction l Λ tξ < l Λ tξ proves Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. l t . In the same way we can prove Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. the total loss L n by defining the ρ-expected total losses nν for all ν and strict inequality for some ν, from which we get the contradiction
with the help of (1). The instantaneous and total expected errors e t and E n can be considered as special loss functions.
Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. s t (and hence S n ) can be understood from geometrical insight. A formal proof for s t goes as follows: With the abbreviations i = x t , y νi =ν(x t |x <t ), z i =ξ(x t |x <t ), r i =ρ(x t |x <t ), and w ν =w ν (x <t )≥0 we ask for a vector r with i (y νi −r i )
where we have used ν w ν = 1 and ν w ν y νi = z i (3). 0 ≥ i (r i −z i ) 2 ≥ 0 implies r=z proving unique Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. s t . Similarly for d t the assumption
which implies r = z proving unique Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. d t . The proofs for S n and D n are similar. 2 We have proven that ξ is uniquely Pareto-optimal w.r.t. s t , S n , d t and D n . In the case of e t , E n , l t and L n there are other ρ = ξ with F (ν,ρ) = F (ν,ξ)∀ν, but the actions/predictions they invoke are unique (y Λρ t =y Λ ξ t ) (if ties in argmax yt are broken in a consistent way), and this is all that counts.
Note that ξ is not Pareto-optimal w.r.t. to all performance measures. Counterexamples can be given for F (ν,ξ)= xt |ν(x t |x <t )−ξ(x t |x <t )| α for α =2, e.g. a t and V n . Nevertheless, for all performance measures which are relevant from a decision theoretic point of view, i.e. for all loss functions l t and L n , ξ has the welcome property of being Pareto-optimal.
Pareto-optimality should be regarded as a necessary condition for a prediction scheme aiming to be optimal. From a practical point of view a significant decrease of F for many ν may be desirable even if this causes a small increase of F for a few other ν. One can show that such a "balanced" improvement is (not) possible in the following sense: For instance, by usingΛ instead of Λ ξ , the w ν -expected loss may increase or decrease, i.e. LΛ nν < >L Λ ξ nν , but on average, the loss can not decrease,
In particular, a loss increase by an amount ∆ λ in only a single environment λ, can cause a decrease by at most the same amount times a factor w λ wη in some other environment η, i.e. a loss increase can only cause a smaller decrease in simpler environments, but a scaled decrease in more complex environments.
We do not regard this as a "No Free Lunch" (NFL) theorem [WM97] . Since most environments are completely random, a small concession on the loss in each of these completely uninteresting environments provides enough margin to yield distinguished performance on the few non-random (interesting) environments. Indeed, we would interpret the NFL theorems for optimization and search in [WM97] as balanced Pareto-optimality results. Interestingly, whereas for prediction only Bayes-mixes are Pareto-optimal, for search and optimization every algorithm is Pareto-optimal.
The term Pareto-optimal has been taken from the economics literature, but there is the closely related notion of unimprovable strategies [BM98] or admissible estimators [Fer67] in statistics for parameter estimation, for which results similar to Theorem 6 exist. Furthermore, it would be interesting to show under which conditions, the class of all Bayes-mixtures (i.e. with all possible values for the weights) is complete in the sense that every Pareto-optimal strategy can be based on a Bayesmixture. Pareto-optimality is sort of a minimal demand on a prediction scheme aiming to be optimal. A scheme which is not even Pareto-optimal cannot be regarded as optimal in any reasonable sense. Pareto-optimality of ξ w.r.t. most performance measures emphasizes the distinctiveness of Bayes-mixture strategies.
On the Optimal Choice of Weights
In the following we indicate the dependency of ξ on w explicitly by writing ξ w . We have shown that the Λ ξw prediction schemes are (balanced) Pareto-optimal, i.e. that no prediction scheme Λ (whether based on a Bayes mix or not) can be uniformly better. Least assumptions on the environment are made for M which are as large as possible. In Section 2.6 we have discussed the set M of all enumerable semimeasures which we regarded as sufficiently large from a computational point of view (see [Sch02a, Hut03b] for even larger sets, but which are still in the computational realm). Agreeing on this M still leaves open the question of how to choose the weights (prior beliefs) w ν , since every ξ w with w ν >0 ∀ν is Pareto-optimal and leads asymptotically to optimal predictions.
We have derived bounds for the mean squared sum S 
All bounds monotonically decrease with increasing w ν . So it is desirable to assign high weights to all ν ∈ M. Due to the (semi)probability constraint ν w ν ≤ 1 one has to find a compromise.
8 In the following we will argue that in the class of enumerable weight functions with short program there is an optimal compromise, namely w ν = 2 −K(ν) . Consider the class of enumerable weight functions with short programs, namely V := {v (.) : M → IR + with ν v ν ≤ 1 and K(v) = O(1)}. Let w ν := 2 −K(ν) and v (·) ∈ V. Corollary 4.3.1 of [LV97, p255] says that K(x) ≤ −log 2 P (x)+K(P )+O(1) for all x if P is an enumerable discrete semimeasure. Identifying P with v and x with (the program index describing) ν we get ln w
This means that the bounds for ξ w depending on lnw −1 ν are at most O(1) larger than the bounds for ξ v depending on lnv −1 ν . So we lose at most an additive constant of order one in the bounds when using ξ w instead of ξ v . In using ξ w we are on the safe side, getting (within O(1)) best bounds for all environments. Since the above justifies the use of ξ w , and ξ w assigns high probability to an environment if and only if it has low (Kolmogorov) complexity, one may interpret the result as a justification of Occam's razor.
9 But note that this is more of a bootstrap argument, since we implicitly used Occam's razor to justify the restriction to enumerable semimeasures. We also considered only weight functions v with low complexity K(v) = O(1). What did not enter as an assumption but came out as a result is that the specific universal weights w ν = 2 −K(ν) are optimal. On the other hand, this choice for w ν is not unique (even not within a constant factor). For instance, for 0 < v ν = O(1) for ν = ξ w and v ν arbitrary (e.g. 0) for all other ν, the obvious dominance ξ ν ≥ v ν ν can be improved to ξ ν ≥ c·w ν ν, where 0<c=O(1) is a universal constant. Indeed, formally every choice of weights v ν >0 ∀ν leads within a multiplicative constant to the same universal distribution, but this constant is not necessarily of "acceptable" size. Details will be presented elsewhere.
Miscellaneous
This section discusses miscellaneous topics. Section 6.1 generalizes the setup to continuous probability classes M = {µ θ } consisting of continuously parameterized distributions µ θ with parameter θ ∈ IR d . Under certain smoothness and regularity conditions a bound for the relative entropy between µ and ξ, which is central for all presented results, can still be derived. The bound depends on the Fisher information of µ and grows only logarithmically with n, the intuitive reason being the necessity to describe θ to an accuracy O(n −1/2 ). Section 6.2 describes two ways of using the prediction schemes for partial sequence prediction, where not every symbol needs to be predicted. Performing and predicting a sequence of independent experiments and online learning of classification tasks are special cases. In Section 6.3 we compare the universal prediction scheme studied here to the popular predictors based on expert advice (PEA) [LW89, Vov92, LW94, CB97, HKW98, KW99] . Although the algorithms, the settings, and the proofs are quite different, the PEA bounds and our error bound have the same structure. Finally, in Section 6.4 we outline possible extensions of the presented theory and results, including infinite alphabets, delayed and probabilistic prediction, active systems influencing the environment, learning aspects, and a unification with PEA.
Continuous Probability Classes M
We have considered thus far countable probability classes M, which makes sense from a computational point of view as emphasized in Section 2.6. On the other hand in statistical parameter estimation one often has a continuous hypothesis class (e.g. a Bernoulli(θ) process with unknown θ ∈ [0,1]). Let
be a family of probability distributions parameterized by a d-dimensional continuous parameter θ. Let µ ≡ µ θ 0 ∈ M be the true generating distribution and θ 0 be in the interior of the compact set Θ. We may restrict M to a countable dense subset, like {µ θ } with computable (or rational) θ. If θ 0 is itself a computable real (or rational) vector then Theorem 1 and bound (18) apply. From a practical point of view the assumption of a computable θ 0 is not so serious. It is more from a traditional analysis point of view that one would like quantities and results depending smoothly on θ and not in a weird fashion depending on the computational complexity of θ. For instance, the weight w(θ) is often a continuous probability density
The most important property of ξ used in this work was ξ(x 1:n ) ≥ w ν ·ν(x 1:n ) which has been obtained from (1) by dropping the sum over ν. The analogous construction here is to restrict the integral over Θ to a small vicinity N δ of θ. For sufficiently smooth µ θ and w(θ) we expect ξ(x 1:n ) > ∼ |N δn |·w(θ)·µ θ (x 1:n ), where |N δn | is the volume of N δn . This in turn leads to D n < ∼ lnw −1 µ +ln|N δn | −1 , where w µ := w(θ 0 ). N δn should be the largest possible region in which lnµ θ is approximately flat on average. The averaged instantaneous, mean, and total curvature matrices of lnµ are
They are the Fisher information of µ and may be viewed as measures of the parametric complexity of µ θ at θ = θ 0 . The last equality can be shown by using the fact that the µ-expected value of ∇lnµ·∇ T lnµ coincides with −∇∇ T lnµ (since X is finite) and a similar equality as in (4) Proof sketch. For independent and identically distributed distributions µ θ (x 1:n ) = µ θ (x 1 )·...·µ θ (x n ) ∀θ this bound has been proven in [CB90, Theorem 2.3] . In this case J [CB90] (θ 0 ) ≡ n ≡ j n independent of n. For stationary (k th -order) Markov processes  n is also constant. The proof generalizes to arbitrary µ θ by replacing J [CB90] (θ 0 ) with n everywhere in their proof. For the proof to go through, the vicinity N δn := {θ :||θ−θ 0 || n ≤δ n } of θ 0 must contract to a point set {θ 0 } for n→ ∞ and δ n → 0. n is always positive semi-definite as can be seen from the definition. The boundedness condition of −1 n implies a strictly positive lower bound independent of n on the eigenvalues of n for all sufficiently large n, which ensures N δn → {θ 0 }. The uniform continuity of n ensures that the remainder o(1) from the Taylor expansion of D n is independent of n. Note that twice continuous differentiability of D n at θ 0 [CB90, Condition 2] follows for finite X from twice continuous differentiability of µ θ . Under some additional technical conditions one can even prove an equality D n = lnw does not lead to a uniform bound unlike the discrete case. A uniform bound is obtained for Bernando's (or in the scalar case Jeffreys') reference prior w(θ)∼ det ∞ (θ) if  ∞ exists [Ris96] .
For a finite alphabet X we consider throughout the paper, j Theorem 8 shows that Theorems 1 and 2 are also applicable to the case of continuously parameterized probability classes. Theorem 8 is also valid for a mixture of the discrete and continuous cases ξ = a dθ w a (θ) µ a θ with a dθ w a (θ) = 1.
Further Applications
Partial sequence prediction. There are (at least) two ways to treat partial sequence prediction. With this we mean that not every symbol of the sequence needs to be predicted, say given sequences of the form z 1 x 1 ...z n x n we want to predict the x ′ s only. The first way is to keep the Λ ρ prediction schemes of the last sections mainly as they are, and use a time dependent loss function, which assigns zero loss ℓ t zy ≡0 at the z positions. Any dummy prediction y is then consistent with (15). The losses for predicting x are generally non-zero. This solution is satisfactory as long as the z ′ s are drawn from a probability distribution. The second (preferable) way does not rely on a probability distribution over the z. We replace all distributions ρ(x 1:n ) (ρ = µ, ν, ξ) everywhere by distributions ρ(x 1:n |z 1:n ) conditioned on z 1:n . The z 1:n conditions cause nowhere problems as they can essentially be thought of as fixed (or as oracles or spectators). So the bounds in Theorems 1...8 also hold in this case for all individual z's. Independent experiments and classification. A typical experimental situation is a sequence of independent (i.i.d) experiments, predictions and observations. At time t one arranges an experiment z t (or observes data z t ), then tries to make a prediction, and finally observes the true outcome x t . Often one has a parameterized class of models (hypothesis space) µ θ (x t |z t ) and wants to infer the true θ in order to make improved predictions. This is a special case of partial sequence prediction, where the hypothesis space M = {µ θ (x 1:n |z 1:n ) = µ θ (x 1 |z 1 )·...·µ θ (x n |z n )} consists of i.i.d. distributions, but note that ξ is not i.i.d. This is the same setting as for on-line learning of classification tasks, where a z ∈ Z should be classified as an x ∈ X .
Prediction with Expert Advice
There are two schools of universal sequence prediction: We considered expected performance bounds for Bayesian prediction based on mixtures of environments, as is common in information theory and statistics [MF98] . The other approach are predictors based on expert advice (PEA) with worst case loss bounds in the spirit of Littlestone, Warmuth, Vovk and others. We briefly describe PEA and compare both approaches. For a more comprehensive comparison see [MF98] . In the following we focus on topics not covered in [MF98] . PEA was invented in [LW89, LW94] and [Vov92] and further developed in [CB97, HKW98, KW99] and by many others. Many variations known by many names (prediction/learning with expert advice, weighted majority/average, aggregating strategy, hedge algorithm, ...) have meanwhile been invented. Early works in this direction are [Daw84, Ris89] . See [Vov99] for a review and further references. We describe the setting and basic idea of PEA for binary alphabet. Consider a finite binary sequence x 1 x 2 ...x n ∈ {0,1} n and a finite set E of experts e ∈ E making predictions x e t in the unit interval [0,1] based on past observations x 1 x 2 ...x t−1 . The loss of expert e in step t is defined as |x t −x e t |. In the case of binary predictions x e t ∈ {0,1}, |x t −x e t | coincides with our error measure (7). The PEA algorithm p βn combines the predictions of all experts. It forms its own prediction 10 x p t ∈ [0,1] according to some weighted average of the expert's predictions x e t . There are certain update rules for the weights depending on some parameter β. Various bounds for the total loss L p (x) := n t=1 |x t −x p t | of PEA in terms of the total loss L ε (x) := n t=1 |x t −x ε t | of the best expert ε ∈ E have been proven. It is possible to fine tune β and to eliminate the necessity of knowing n in advance. The first bound of this kind has been obtained in [CB97] :
The constants 2.8 and 4 have been improved in [AG00, YEY01] . The last bound in Theorem 2 with S n ≤D n ≤ln|M| for uniform weights and with
It has a quite similar structure as (23), although the algorithms, the settings, the proofs, and the interpretation are quite different. Whereas PEA performs well in any environment, but only relative to a given set of experts E, our Θ ξ predictor competes with the best possible Θ µ predictor (and hence with any other Θ predictor), but only in expectation and for a given set of environments M. PEA depends on the set of experts, Θ ξ depends on the set of environments M. The basic p βn algorithm has been extended in different directions: incorporation of different initial weights (|E|;w −1 ν ) [LW89, Vov92] , more general loss functions [HKW98] , continuous valued outcomes [HKW98] , and multi-dimensional predictions [KW99] (but not yet for the absolute loss). The work of [Yam98] lies somewhat in between PEA and this work; "PEA" techniques are used to prove expected loss bounds (but only for sequences of independent symbols/experiments and limited classes of loss functions). Finally, note that the predictions of PEA are continuous. This is appropriate for weather forecasters which announce the probability of rain, but the decision to wear sunglasses or to take an umbrella is binary, and the suffered loss depends on this binary decision, and not on the probability estimate. It is possible to convert the continuous prediction of PEA into a probabilistic binary prediction by predicting 1 with probability x p t ∈ [0,1]. |x t −x p t | is then the probability of making an error. Note that the expectation is taken over the probabilistic prediction, whereas for the deterministic Θ ξ algorithm the expectation is taken over the environmental distribution µ. The multi-dimensional case [KW99] could then be interpreted as a (probabilistic) prediction of symbols over an alphabet X = {0,1}
d , but error bounds for the absolute loss have yet to be proven. In [FS97] the regret is bounded by ln|E|+ 2L ln|E| for arbitrary unit loss function and alphabet, whereL is an upper bound on L ε , which has to be known in advance. It would be interesting to generalize PEA and bound (23) to arbitrary alphabet and weights and to general loss functions with probabilistic interpretation.
Outlook
In the following we discuss several directions in which the findings of this work may be extended.
Infinite alphabet. In many cases the basic prediction unit is not a letter, but a number (for inducing number sequences), or a word (for completing sentences), or a real number or vector (for physical measurements). The prediction may either be generalized to a block by block prediction of symbols or, more suitably, the finite alphabet X could be generalized to countable (numbers, words) or continuous (real or vector) alphabets. The presented theorems are independent of the size of X and hence should generalize to countably infinite alphabets by appropriately taking the limit |X |→∞ and to continuous alphabets by a denseness or separability argument. Since the proofs are also independent of the size of X we may directly replace all finite sums over X by infinite sums or integrals and carefully check the validity of each operation. We expect all theorems to remain valid in full generality, except for minor technical existence and convergence constraints.
An infinite prediction space Y was no problem at all as long as we assumed the existence of y Λρ t ∈Y (15). In case y Λρ t ∈Y does not exist one may define y Λρ t ∈Y in a way to achieve a loss at most ε t = o(t −1 ) larger than the infimum loss. We expect a small finite correction of the order of ε = ∞ t=1 ε t < ∞ in the loss bounds somehow. Delayed & probabilistic prediction. The Λ ρ schemes and theorems may be generalized to delayed sequence prediction, where the true symbol x t is given only in cycle t+d. A delayed feedback is common in many practical problems. We expect bounds with D n replaced by d·D n . Further, the error bounds for the probabilistic suboptimal ξ scheme defined and analyzed in [Hut01b] can also be generalized to arbitrary alphabet.
More active systems. Prediction means guessing the future, but not influencing it. A small step in the direction of more active systems was to allow the Λ system to act and to receive a loss ℓ xtyt depending on the action y t and the outcome x t . The probability µ is still independent of the action, and the loss function ℓ t has to be known in advance. This ensures that the greedy strategy (15) is optimal. The loss function may be generalized to depend not only on the history x <t , but also on the historic actions y <t with µ still independent of the action. It would be interesting to know whether the scheme Λ and/or the loss bounds generalize to this case. The full model of an acting agent influencing the environment has been developed in [Hut01c] . Pareto-optimality and asymptotic bounds are proven in [Hut02] , but a lot remains to be done in the active case.
Miscellaneous. Another direction is to investigate the learning aspect of universal prediction. Many prediction schemes explicitly learn and exploit a model of the environment. Learning and exploitation are melted together in the framework of universal Bayesian prediction. A separation of these two aspects in the spirit of hypothesis learning with MDL [VL00] could lead to new insights. Also, the separation of noise from useful data, usually an important issue [GTV01] , did not play a role here. The attempt at an information theoretic interpretation of Theorem 3 may be made more rigorous in this or another way. In the end, this may lead to a simpler proof of Theorem 3 and maybe even for the loss bounds. A unified picture of the loss bounds obtained here and the loss bounds for predictors based on expert advice (PEA) could also be fruitful. Yamanishi [Yam98] used PEA methods to prove expected loss bounds for Bayesian prediction, so maybe the proof technique presented here could be used vice versa to prove more general loss bounds for PEA. Maximumlikelihood or MDL predictors may also be studied. For instance, 2 −K(x) (or some of its variants) is a close approximation of ξ U , so one may think that predictions based on (variants of) K may be as good as predictions based on ξ U , but it is easy to see that K completely fails for predictive purposes. Also, more promising variants like the monotone complexity Km and universal two-part MDL, both extremely close to ξ U , fail in certain situations [Hut03c] . Finally, the system should be applied to specific induction problems for specific M with computable ξ.
Summary
We compared universal predictions based on Bayes-mixtures ξ to the infeasible informed predictor based on the unknown true generating distribution µ. Our main focus was on a decision-theoretic setting, where each prediction y t ∈ X (or more generally action y t ∈ Y) results in a loss ℓ xtyt if x t is the true next symbol of the sequence. We have shown that the Λ ξ predictor suffers only slightly more loss than the Λ µ predictor. We have shown that the derived error and loss bounds cannot be improved in general, i.e. without making extra assumptions on ℓ, µ, M, or w ν . Within a factor of 2 this is also true for any µ independent predictor. We have also shown Pareto-optimality of ξ in the sense that there is no other predictor which performs at least as well in all environments ν ∈ M and strictly better in at least one. Optimal predictors can (in most cases) be based on mixture distributions ξ. Finally we gave an Occam's razor argument that the universal prior with weights w ν = 2 −K(ν) is optimal, where K(ν) is the Kolmogorov complexity of ν. Of course, optimality always depends on the setup, the assumptions, and the chosen criteria. For instance, the universal predictor was not always Pareto-optimal, but at least for many popular, and for all decision theoretic performance measures. Bayes predictors are also not necessarily optimal under worst case criteria [CBL01] . We also derived a bound for the relative entropy between ξ and µ in the case of a continuously parameterized family of environments, which allowed us to generalize the loss bounds to continuous M. Furthermore, we discussed the duality between the Bayes-mixture and expert-mixture (PEA) approaches and results, classification tasks, games of chances, infinite alphabet, active systems influencing the environment, and others.
